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Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget
Julie Roin*
University of Chicago Law School
“[T]he Administration believes that the concept of ‘tax expenditure’ is of
questionable analytic value.”1
President Bush sparked a minor firestorm within the Beltway by including these
words in his fiscal 2002 budget analysis.2 This was not because the tax expenditure budget—
which sets out the implicit cost of various deductions and provisions of the tax code—was
viewed as beyond criticism. Various aspects of the tax expenditure budget have been
attacked since its inception, and the particular objection raised by the 2002 budget
document—the absence of a normative baseline for determining what constitutes a tax
expenditures3—was among the earliest to surface.4 Rather, it was the language of the attack
that seemed remarkable. It sounded to many like the opening salvo in a battle to overturn the
Congressional requirement that such a budget be constructed and published as part of the
annual budget.5
Public evidence of this battle remains scarce. Indeed, the language contained in the
following year’s budget seems to back away from prior year’s blanket condemnation of the
tax expenditure budget. The 2003 budget states merely that A[t]he Administration believes
the meaningfulness of tax expenditure estimates is uncertain and that the ‘tax expenditure’
presentation can be improved by consideration of alternative or additional tax bases.”6 Yet it
*

Seymour Logan Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I would like to express my
thanks to those who commented on prior drafts of this Article: Saul Levmore and participants in the Harvard
Law School’s Seminar on Current Research in Taxation, the University of Illinois College of Law faculty
workshop and the University of Michigan Law School Law and Economics Workshop. Thanks are also due to
the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for their financial support.
1
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2002, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 61
(2001)[hereinafter 2002 BUDGET].
2
See Heidi Glenn, Bush Administration Questions Value of Tax Expenditures List, 91 TAX NOTES 535,
535 (2001); Martin Sullivan, Administration Reignites Old Battle Over Tax Expenditures, 91 TAX NOTES 701,
701 (2001) (“the text of the Bush budget jolted tax policy aficionados to attention”).
3
2002 BUDGET, supra note 1, at 61.
4
See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, The End of Tax Expenditures as We Know Them, 92 TAX NOTES 413, 414-17
(2001) (recounting history of disputes over existence and meaning of baseline); Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for
Federal ‘Tax Subsidies’ in the National Budget, 22 NAT’L TAX J. 244, 247 (1969); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey
S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661, 1661 (1992); Victor Thuronyi, Tax
Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L. J. 1155, 1166-67 (1988).
5
See Bruce Bartlett, supra note 4, at 413; Heidi Glenn, supra note 2, at 535.
6
BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2003, ANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES 95
(2002)[hereinafter 2003 BUDGET].
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is hard to believe that the 2002 budget language was an error, or a misrepresentation of the
Administration’s feelings towards the tax expenditure budget. A substantial faction probably
favors its elimination, which means the issue will probably resurface in the not-very-distant
future.7 And when it does, we should be prepared to discuss the relevant issues.
Those issues include both those raised by the President and others that are routinely
ignored. The most important is that all the sources of information we have about
government spending suffer from problems similar if not identical to those identified in the
tax expenditure budget. Take, for example, the absence of an agreed-upon baseline of a
“normal” tax system against which to measure “tax expenditures”. A central theme of the
article is that the same baseline problem exists for several clear substitutes for tax
expenditures, regulation and the non-enforcement of across-the-board rules. Even the
seemingly obvious baseline of zero expenditures for determining the amount of cash
subsidies can be challenged as incompletely theorized and misleading. The breadth and
depth of the baseline and other problems throw into question the wisdom of excoriating the
tax expenditure budget in particular. If improving the utility of information distributed about
the direction and function of government is the desired end, one must focus at least as much
on the interaction between the various information sources as on the merits or demerits of
any particular source of information. And once we do that, this article argues, it becomes
clear that the better path involves the publication of more, rather than less, information. In
particular, the article contends that it would be helpful to publish an admittedly flawed
regulatory budget to serve as a companion to the tax expenditure budget as part of the annual
budget process.
I. Introduction: The Importance of Information in a Democratic Society
Though reasonable people disagree about precisely which policy initiatives constitute
“rent-seeking” (as opposed to “good public policy”), all agree that in theory, government can
be misused to extract money from a poorly-organized majority and to redistribute it to an
undeserving but well-organized minority.8 In addition to the implicit unfairness of such
7

The public silence may indicate only that the battleground has shifted to behind the closed doors of
the Congressional budget committees.
8
This insight underlies the school of thought known as “public choice theory.” See JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 286-87 (1962); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 35 (1965). For a summary of the literature
on interest group theory, see, e.g., Einer L. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Review?, 101 YALE L. J. 31, 35 (1991); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of
the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 36-45 (1990);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 285 (1988). The intellectual lineage of public choice theory stretches at
least as far back as James Madison. See Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci
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activity, this raises serious efficiency concerns. Not only do groups waste their time and
energy seeking (or opposing) such redistribution,9 but the method of redistribution may
induce additional undesirable behavior.10 Price-support programs may lead farmers to plant
covered crops rather than others that can be sold at a profit on the open market; “favorable”
regulation may cause utility companies to continue to utilize out-dated, pollution-spewing
equipment rather than invest in newer and cleaner technology. Some amount of rentseeking11 is endemic to all societies and all political systems,12 and perhaps to all human
relationships.13 However, most people also believe that steps can be taken to minimize its
amount. Political systems and institutions can be designed to reduce the rewards from rentseeking behavior, thereby reducing the resources invested in this unproductive endeavor and
correspondingly increasing the resources devoted to productive enterprises.14 A legal system
sensitive to public choice concerns must identify these arrangements and institutions.

Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L. J. 1165, 1171 (1993).
9
See DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II , at 229-35 (1989); James D. Gwartney & Richard E.
Wagner, Public Choice and the Conduct of Representative Government, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 3, 22-23 (1988); Einer Elhauge, supra note 8, at 43.; Daniel Shaviro, supra note
8, at 38.
10
See Daniel Shaviro, supra note 8, at 341; GORDON TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE
AND RENT SEEKING 19 (1989).
11
As the previous paragraph illustrates, the term “rent-seeking” is used to describe two quite different
types of socially destructive behavior. One use of the term refers to attempts to extract personal gain at the
expense of the larger society. See Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking and Tax Reform, 6 CONTEMP. POL. ISSUES 37,
37 (1988) (”My personal definition of rent seeking essentially is using resources to obtain rents for people
where the rents themselves come from something with negative social value.”). This use of the term is
associated with concepts such as “negative log-rolling”, where each interest group constituency receives a share
of governmental largesse, but each ends up worse off than if there had been no largesse at all, see Daniel
Shaviro, supra note 8, at 37, and “collective action problems,” where a combination of free-riding and
organizational disparities allow small, concentrated groups to take advantage of more diffuse majorities. See
Einer Elhauge, supra note 8, at 37-38. “Rent-seeking” can also refer to attempts to appropriate (through the
political system or otherwise) gains generated by beneficial transactions. The resources expended in such efforts
to achieve such transfers of wealth are “wasted”, thus offsetting the gains (or consumer surplus) generated by
the underlying transaction. See Daniel Shaviro, supra note 8, at 38. This Article considers both forms of
misbehavior to be “rent-seeking.”
12
Although the public choice literature focuses on rent-seeking in representative democracies, this is a
function of the context within which such scholars are working. Similar analytic methods could no doubt be
employed to explain the rise and fall of court “favorites” and other phenomenon in autocratic regimes.
13
A number of academics analyze employment relationships and labor laws in terms of “rent-seeking”
opportunities. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the
Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419, 491 (1992); Paul H. Rubin and
Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not To Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 97 (1981). Others have
looked at marriage and divorce through the same lens. See Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The
Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L. J. 2423, 2440 (1994).
14
See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, supra note 8, at 289-94; Edward A. Zelinsky,
supra note 8, at 1172 (outlining Madisonian solution); id. at 1173 (summarizing “contemporary agency
scholarship”); Einer Elhauge, supra note 8, at 44-46 (summarizing proposals for using judicial review as
counterbalance to interest group capture) .
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In democratic systems, rent-seeking is partly a function of agency problems, arising
from the public’s lax monitoring of its agents.15 These agents include both the politicians
responsible for generating laws and the bureaucrats entrusted with administering and
enforcing them. In less technical terms, this means that politicians and bureaucrats cater to
special interests because the public fails to punish them for doing so—by throwing them out
of office16—often enough. Many explanations exist for the public’s failure to punish
offending politicians. Some believe that the problem consists of a lack of easily accessible
and comprehensible information.17 The public would punish politicians more if they knew
the extent of their transgressions, just as they take action against corporations once they have
been revealed to be major polluters.18 This belief has led to calls for the provision of better,
more accessible information about the actions of government officials.
Of course, the public provision of information about governmental behavior serves a
broader purpose in democratic societies than the control of rent-seeking behavior.
Governance often requires establishing priorities, making hard decisions based on
incomplete information, or choosing between competing values. Voters need to know
whether the actions taken by their government accord with their personal beliefs and
preferences19 to intelligently choose between returning incumbents to political office and
seeking new alternatives.
Finally, information about past and current government programs can help
government officials make better decisions. It helps avoid the creation of duplicative
15

See Daniel Shaviro, supra note 8, at 39-40 (describing “efficient shirking” by voters).
Politicians can be directly voted out of office. Punishing bureaucrats is more difficult, especially
when they are protected by civil service regulations. However, many of the top-level bureaucrats are political
appointees. Those who serve under them can be fired (even under civil service regulations) for insubordination
should they fail to abide by the policies set by their department heads; as a practical matter, though, it may be
difficult to differentiate between active disobedience and less-than-stellar (but not discharge-worthy)
performance.
17
One prominent public choice theorist explains that because interest groups realize that a direct
transfer of public monies to their group would be too “raw,” they try to conceal what is really going on from the
public at large. See GORDON TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND RENT-SEEKING 19 (1989).
18
The Toxic Release Inventory, section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-toKnow Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. '' 11,001-11,050 (1994), has been acclaimed as one of the most successful antipollution laws in recent history. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward A Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and
Managing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 956 (2002) (TRI “a smashing
policy success”). By requiring facilities in specified industrial sectors to file annual disclosures of their releases
of some 650 listed toxic substances, “[i]t subjects the environmental performance of facilities and firms to an
unprecedented degree of scrutiny by their peers, competitors, investors, employees, consumers, community
residents....and the public in general.... These external monitors often have powerful tools at their
disposal...which they use to discipline poor performances.” Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as
Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L. J.
257, 261-262 (2001). This law has been credited with “dramatic reductions” in reported releases. Id. at 259.
19
Opponents often describe decisions that they disagree with as “rent-seeking” or interest group
“grabs” whether or not they meet the technical definition of “rent-seeking” found in footnote 11, supra.
16
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programs, and can provide general information regarding the financial or other consequences
of particular government actions.
II. The Tax Expenditure Budget as a Provider of Information
A. The History of the Tax Expenditure Budget
The tax expenditure budget was developed as just such an informational aid. In the
late 1960’s, Stanley Surrey, developed a theory that “special” tax rules which reduced tax
liability had the same economic and social effects as direct government expenditures, and
should be analyzed accordingly for economic and political purposes.20 He pioneered the
concept of the “tax expenditure budget” to catalogue both such provisions and their cost in
terms of foregone tax revenue.21 The budget identifies “departures from the normal tax
structure” and estimates the revenue the government would have collected in the absence of
those provisions, and thus the implicit cost of these provisions. When he became the
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy during the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations, Surrey worked tirelessly to convince Congress of the need to publish a tax
expenditure budget as part of the President’s annual budget.22 These efforts did not come to
fruition until 1974, long after Surrey returned to his Harvard professorship.23 Only then did
20

See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 706 (1970); see generally Jonathan
Barry Forman, Origins of the Tax Expenditure Budget, 30 Tax Notes 538 (1986) (“Surrey gave the phrase ‘tax
expenditure’ its first public exposure on November 15, 1967 in a "[sic] speech to the Money Marketeers, a New
York Financial group.”); Edward A. Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 1165 n.1 (detailing Surrey’s role). Living as he
did in a less cynical era, Surrey worried less about self-interested government actors than about irrational or
careless decisionmaking. Surrey believed that the use of tax expenditures interfered with “the ability of the
Government to maintain control over the management of its priorities’ by undercutting the budget process, see
Stanley S. Surrey, supra, at 731, and avoided the oversight of the “appropriate congressional committee charged
with the legislative area involved”, see id. at 728. He hoped that publication of a tax expenditure budget would
lead to the elimination of tax expenditures and their replacement (when appropriate) with direct expenditure
programs. See STANLEY SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 38–39 (1973); Victor Thuronyi, supra note 4, at
1155. The continued survival of tax expenditures shows them to be more deeply-rooted—and more attributable
to deliberate political decisions than ignorant or careless governance—than Surrey initially contended.
21
See Jonathan Barry Forman, supra, at 538-539.
22
See Jonathan Barry Forman, supra note 20, at 540 (“Surrey devoted a great deal of effort to getting
the Bureau of the Budget to agree to include the tax expenditure analysis in the budget...”).
23
Surrey earlier convinced the Secretary of the Treasury to include a tax expenditure budget in his
Annual Report. Id. at 540. The first tax expenditure budget appeared as an appendix to the Annual Report of the
Secretary of the Treasury for the Fiscal Year 1968. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Annual Report of the
Secretary of the Treasury on the State of Finances for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1968, at 322-40 (1969)
(Exhibit 29). This practice, in modified form, survived the change of administrations in 1970. See U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of Finances for the
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1970, at 306-08, (1971) (list of “tax aidsh”). The Ways and Means Committee
began printing Treasury/Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation estimates of federal tax expenditures on
an annual basis in 1972. Jonathan Barry Forman, supra, at 542 (detailing legislative background). The Joint
Committee continues to publish a list of tax expenditures on an annual basis. The Joint Committee analysis of
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Congress pass legislation mandating the inclusion of a tax expenditure budget in the annual
federal budget report.24
Although this act requires a listing of “tax expenditures” in the budget, it provides
little in the way of guidance about either the form or content of such a listing. As a result, the
presentation of the tax expenditure budget has varied over time. Initially, the budget was
compiled using “a practical variant of a comprehensive income tax” as the baseline or
“normal tax” against which deviations were measured.25 Beginning in 1983, however, the
budget displayed tax expenditures measured against a revised baseline, entitled the
“reference tax” in addition to the normal baseline. The normal and reference tax baselines
differ in their treatment of the rate structure,26 government transfer payments,27 accelerated
depreciation,28 and some foreign income.29 The 1982 budget was the first to add a table
displaying the various tax expenditures in terms of their “outlay equivalents”—or how much
money the government would have to transfer to get the same economic effect as the tax
expenditure.30 Beginning in 1995, the budget included a table estimating the cost in present
value terms of provisions leading to tax deferrals (as opposed to total forgiveness).31

tax expenditures varies in some respects from that produced by Treasury for use in the Presidential budget
document See Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2000–4,
December 22, 1999, reprinted in 86 TAX NOTES 103, 107–9 (2000) (outlining differences between the tax
expenditure budgets).
24
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 mandated the preparation of an annual tax expenditure
budget. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. Law No. 93-3444, ' 308, 88 Stat.
297, 313 (1974) (current version at 2 U.S.C. ' 640(c)(3) (200– )). See generally Bruce Bartlett, supra note 4, at
414 (detailing legislative history of tax expenditure budget); Jonathan Barry Forman, supra note 20, at 542–44
(legislation sponsored by Sen. Javits).
25
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TAX EXPENDITURES: RECENT
EXPERIENCES 108 (1996). Both the executive branch and congressional staffs agreed on a common concept of a
“normal tax” during this period. See BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES, FISCAL 1985, SPECIAL ANALYSES G-1
(1985)[hereinafter 1985 BUDGET].
26
The normal tax baseline uses the maximum rate of corporate tax as its baseline, treating the lower tax
rate applied to the first $10 million of corporate income as a tax expenditure, while the reference tax takes the
entire tax schedule as a baseline. Similarly, the reference tax does not treat the preferential tax rate for capital
gains as a tax expenditure. See 2003 BUDGET, supra note 6, at 112.
27
The normal tax baseline treats all cash transfers from the Government to individuals as gross income,
and exemptions of such transfers from the tax base as tax expenditures. The reference baseline ignores these
transfers. Id. at 113.
28
The reference tax baseline, unlike the normal tax baseline, ignores accelerated depreciation. Id.
29
The normal tax baseline treats the deferral of tax on income of controlled foreign corporations as a
tax expenditure while the reference tax baseline does not. Id.
30
See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 25, at 108; 1985
BUDGET, supra note 25, at G-12. The amount differs from the tax expenditure amount primarily because the
government transfers would be subject to tax upon receipt. Id. at G-12.
31
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 25, at 110.
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All of these changes were attempts to improve the quality of the information
provided by the tax expenditure budget. As detailed below, however, many continue to
attack imperfections in the tax expenditure budget.
B. Continuing Questions About Quality
The quality of the information conveyed by the tax expenditure budget has been
subject to question from its inception. These criticisms focused, and continue to focus, on
two issues. One is the baseline issue, the question of what to consider as “normal” for
purposes of identifying and measuring deviations or “tax preferences”. The other is simply
the reliability of the numbers associated with the identified preferences. These are not minor
quibbles whether one’s aim is to identify legislative misbehavior in catering to “special
interests” or merely to learn how the government has directed its limited resources. For both,
one needs to know to whom such largesse has been directed and in what amounts.
Unfortunately, the tax expenditure budget continues to fall short of perfection on these
measurement issues.
1. The Baseline Issue
One of the earliest critics of the tax expenditure budget, Boris Bittker, noted that,
[t]o effect a ‘full accounting,’ then, we must first construct an ideal or correct income
tax structure, departures from which will be reflected as ‘tax expenditures’ in the
National budget..... If the lack of an agreed conceptual model makes it impossible to
say whether a large number of structural features of the existing federal income tax
laws are, or are not, ‘tax expenditures,’ the proposed ‘full accounting’ may turn out,
in the end, to be only a partial accounting. In this event, it will succeed in bringing
some issues to the fore only to conceal others;....32
Bittker went on to detail a number of areas in which no “agreed conceptual model” existed.33
Later critics have reiterated these concerns,34 sometimes adding a political twist. Several
have alleged that Surrey’s “subjective vision” implemented in the “normal tax” baseline
(and, to a lesser extent, the “reference tax” baseline) targets those provisions aiding
32

Boris I. Bittker, supra note 4, at 248, 258-59. See generally Jonathan Barry Forman, supra note 20, at
539 n.15 (“This issue is central in the early debate over the validity of the tax expenditure concept.”). Even
those relatively comfortable with Surrey’s choice of a Haig-Simons income baseline quarreled with his
resolution of the ambiguities inherent in that concept as well as his incorporation of generally accepted tax and
accounting structures. See, e.g., Victor Thuronyi, supra note 4, at 1155 (“[T]hese compromises have made the
idea of a normative income tax so inherently subjective that it deprives the tax expenditure concept of its
persuasive force.”); id. at 1167-70 (summarizing positions of critics); Douglas A. Kahn and Jeffrey S. Lehman,
supra note 4, at 1663.
33
Boris I. Bittker, supra note 4, at 250-58.
34
See Victor Thuronyi, supra note 4, at 1170; Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, supra note 4, at
1663.
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businesses and wealthier taxpayers while overlooking those aspects of the tax system (such
as the progressive rate structure) that benefit lower-income individuals and others (such as
the corporate income tax) that target higher income taxpayers.35 As implemented, the
argument goes, the tax expenditure budget (even as modified by the addition of the reference
tax baseline) incorporates a liberal agenda.36
There is little doubt about the validity of these criticisms. The tax expenditure
budget, as currently constructed (and probably however constructed37) imperfectly reflects
the political considerations underlying the construction of the tax code. As such, it provides
an incomplete and inaccurate measure of special interest influence. It is full of oddities. For
example, while the deduction for charitable contributions is treated as a tax expenditure, the
treatment of some entities as tax-exempt is not.38 The implicit assumption that all tax
expenditures are bad39 can also be distracting. There is no particular reason to believe that
tax expenditures are any more likely than direct expenditures to be the result of special
interest pandering rather than a legitimate mechanism for overcoming a collective action
problem.40 Nor is it clear, as some have suggested,41 that Congressional decision making
would be improved by remitting control over various tax expenditures to the Congressional
subcommittee with jurisdiction over the substantive area affected.42 And at this point, it is
hard to argue, at Surrey did, that many of the provisions result from Congressional failures to
“know what was being spent through the tax system or for what purposes...[because] there
was no accounting” for them.43 It may well be time to rethink the way some of the
35

See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, supra note 4, at 419. Of course, if the corporate income tax is considered a
tax expenditure, one would have to reconsider treating the realization requirement as one as well, since it allows
shareholders to exclude (sometimes permanently) the income generated from corporate investments from the
shareholders’ income tax base. The two adjustments may come close to canceling each other out.
36
Id. at 421 (revision of tax expenditure budget would be a “threat to liberal dominance of the tax
reform debate”); see also Gene Steuerle, The New Old Tax Expenditure Debate, 95 TAX NOTES 1671 (2002).
37
See Boris Bittker, supra note 4, at 251 (a “full accounting” of departures from the Haig-Simons
model would be “a formidable undertaking”); Boris Bittker, “ ‘Comprehensive Income Base’ as a Goal of
Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV.925, 929 (1967) (citing Pechman, What Would a Comprehensive
Individual Income Tax Yield?, I 1959 COMPENDIUM 251, 259) (“‘To determine the extent of erosion, we must
first have some notion as to what the tax system ought to be. Since this is to a large extent a matter of equity,
and since equity judgments are highly personal, no single standard will meet everybody’s approval.’“).
38
This cannot be justified as a method of avoiding double-counting since many tax-exempt
organizations earn income as well as raise money through tax-exempt donations.
39
See Boris Bittker, supra note 4, at 248 (“not insignificant” that initial “minimum list” of tax
expenditures seemed to be “limited to those provisions that the incumbent Secretary of the Treasury wants
Congress to repeal”).
40
Although critics of tax expenditures have long alleged that the tax system is more susceptible to rentseeking than direct expenditure programs, the one empirical study of this issue suggests that little or no
difference in results flow from admitted differences in procedure. See Edward A. Zelinsky, supra note 8, at
1190–91.
41
See Stanley S. Surrey, supra note 20, at 728-29; Victor Thuronyi, supra note 4, at 1161.
42
See Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process,
35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387, 402-04 (1998) (unifying budget by function would generate timing mismatches).
43
See Stanley S. Surrey, supra note 20, at 730.
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ambiguities in the Haig-Simons income concept are being resolved and broaden (or shorten)
the list of tax expenditures to cover more (or less) than those Surrey would have preferred to
“move...—to the extent that government assistance is still considered desirable—from the
tax expenditure budget to the regular budget” in the form of direct expenditure programs. 44
But the proper response to this criticism lies in a reexamination of the list of tax
expenditures, broadening and deepening the level of public exposure, not scrapping the
whole instrument. The criticism in no way refutes the underlying insight that specially
favorable tax rules constitute a form of government subsidy or expenditure, nor suggests that
the information we have should be suppressed.
2. The Numbers
The choice of the baseline affects the identification of tax expenditures. Some tax
provisions that are treated as tax expenditures under one baseline do not appear as tax
expenditures under another. Picking the “wrong” baseline can generate misleading
information. But voters and politicians also can be misled if they believe that a particular tax
expenditure is much more (or less) costly than it actually is. And many suspect that the tax
expenditure budget, as currently formulated, makes many such errors, perhaps enough to
make the schedule worse than useless.
One problem flows from the lack of good information about those utilizing various
tax expenditures. Tax returns contain enough information to detail who claims how much in
mortgage interest deductions and, more recently, the government has begun collecting
information regarding receipts of tax exempt interest. But tax returns do not provide the
government with the identity of the taxpayers affected by, and thus the amount of tax lost
due to, the exclusion of interest on life insurance savings, exceptions from imputed interest
rules, or most of the employee fringe benefit exclusions.45 Even the number assigned to the
amount of tax lost to the step-up in the basis of capital gains at death is questionable, since
an accurate computation requires knowledge of decedents’ asset bases—and it is precisely
the government’s (or anyone else’s) lack of such knowledge that justified the repeal of
section 1023 in 1978.46 Similar information deficits exist with respect to other tax
expenditures.

44

See Stanley S. Surrey, supra note 20, at 737-38.
None of this information is required to be reported on individual tax schedules. See Form 1040.
46
See Howard J. Hoffman, The Role of the Bar in the Tax Legislative Process, 37 TAX L. REV. 413,
487-488 (1982) (discussing role of perceived “unreasonable recordkeeping burdens” on repeal of section 1023).
45
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Of course, other sources of information exist which, like tax returns, can provide a
starting point for determining the cost of various tax expenditures. Estimators use a variety
of governmental databases, ranging from census results to national income and product
accounts, as well as numerous private industry sources. But extracting the necessary
information takes both time and money; and periodically one hears unsettling rumors
regarding the priority (or lack thereof) accorded preparation of this document by the
chronically overworked Treasury staff. Although the consensus seems to be that this
estimating process has improved over time,47 it surely remains far from perfect.
Nor do the problems with the figures end there. Because of interactions between
various rules, the amount of tax revenue lost under the existing tax rules is of only limited
value in determining the effects of modifying or eliminating such rules, the real “cost” of
such provisions.48 The various tax expenditures often serve as substitutes for one another;
eliminate one and another grows in significance.49 For example, eliminating the tax
preference for state and local bonds may cause investment to shift from such bonds into
housing, another non-taxable asset. Revenue gains associated with such a rule change thus
may be minimal even if though the rule exempting state and local bond interest from income
appears to generate a large revenue loss on the tax expenditure budget.
In sum, substantial, valid concerns have been raised about the construction and
interpretation of the tax expenditure budget. Moreover, there is no easy (or even difficult)
way to completely remedy these problems. It would be easy to conclude that the tax
expenditure budget fails at its intended purpose, of providing both government officials and
the voting public with information regarding the government’s true priorities, including
opportunistic behaviors, and thus should be abolished. But that conclusion is too simplistic,
if for no other reason than that similar problems afflict other sources of information on
governmental priorities. As the next section points out, the rest of the federal budget
document suffers from equally serious—and indeed almost identical—problems. If the
objections to the tax expenditure budget warrant its elimination, they would also warrant
ceasing publication of the remainder of the budget.
III. Matching Defects in the Regular Federal Budget

47

See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 25, at 110.
This problem is acknowledged in the explanation accompanying the tax expenditure budget. See
2003 BUDGET, supra note 6, at .
49
Again, this was a problem noted by Professor Bittker in 1969. See Boris L. Bittker, supra note 4, at
247.
48
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At first glance, the “regular” federal budget, estimating the amounts to be expended
by the government over the next fiscal year, appears unproblematic. After all, in the absence
of government, there would be no governmental expenditures. Thus, the use of a zero
expenditure baseline as the measure of governmental financial largesse—and power—makes
intuitive sense. Further reflection, though, reveals that this zero expenditure baseline is as
problematic as the “normal” (or “reference tax”) baselines. Nor are the numbers generated
under that baseline particularly trustworthy; large discrepancies often arise between planned
and actual expenditure levels. The closer one looks, the more similar the two types of
budgets—the tax expenditure budget and the regular budget—appear, warts and all.
A. The Baseline Problem in the Regular Budget
Political analysts and ordinary citizens routinely look at the amounts projected in the
budget to be spent on various groups as evidence of the direction and extent of governmental
(warranted and unwarranted) favoritism. The more money directed at any particular group,
the greater its presumed political influence—a term not to be confused with social merit.50
For example, the members of the (non-farming) public generally regards a $100 million
increase in payments to farmers as an indicia of successful “rent-seeking” behavior by that
political group.51 That is, they view the additional expenditure as a diversion of $100 million
that properly belongs to them (or to governmental programs that they favor) to the farm
lobby. Further, many believe that the polity as a whole is worse off as a result of this transfer
either because of the higher tax burden52 or because their preferred programs would have
generated higher social benefits than the farm programs actually being financed.53 Moreover,
they may see such successful transfers as encouraging the further development of the
socially useless lobbying industry.54 The federal budget, in short, provides a road-map of
contemporary rent-seeking successes, as well as providing an illustration of the current
government’s relative priorities..

50

The difference between a “socially valuable expenditure” and “socially wasteful rent-seeking” lies in
the eyes of the beholder. Reasonable people can, and frequently do, disagree over the proper characterization of
particular government payments. To a large extent, such disagreements can be expressed as disagreements over
“priorities” discussed supra TAN 19.
51
Farmers undoubtedly view such sums as proper recognition of their importance in society and to the
economy. Once again, the distinction between “rent-seeking” and differing priorities or views of the world is
blurry.
52
Higher by an amount in excess of $100 million, since additional monies must be raised to finance the
collection and processing of that $100 million. In addition to the higher extraction, many would contend that
they would have been able to put the money to a better use than the government.
53
See supra note 11 (defining rent-seeking).
54
See id.
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But there is less information provided by using a zero-expenditure baseline than
meets the eye. First, the treatment of all expenditures as evidence of rent-seeking (achieving)
understates the use of the government’s taxing power as a mechanism to overcome collective
action and free rider problems. Further, the apparent beneficiaries of many programs may be
quite different from the real, economic beneficiaries; looking only at who receives the funds
may divert attention from the identity of the real recipients of government largesse. Each of
these problems is discussed below.
Although there would be no government expenditures in the absence of government,
there would be no taxes either. As a result, individuals and corporations would have more
money.55 One suspects that much of this extra money would go towards the purchase of
benefits normally provided at the governmental level. After all, most people would still want
roads, schools, sewer systems and the like.56 This is a long way of making the obvious point
that to a large extent, tax monies are expended to benefit the very people who pay the tax.
The zero expenditure baseline fails to differentiate redistributional (which may or may not
represent rent-seeking, or socially inefficient pandering to special interests) expenditures
from self-financed benefits, situations in which the government is best viewed as a neutral
stakeholder, the device used to overcome free rider problems endemic to the provision of
public goods. To make political sense of the information provided by the regular budget, one
must differentiate between expenditures that consist of the return of particular taxpayers’ tax
monies in the form of services and those that result in a net gain to some subgroup of
taxpayers, since only the latter could be characterized as the result of “rent-seeking.”57 The
failure to do so is highly misleading, as to both the identity and amount of potential rentseeking and priority-setting.
In a sense, this baseline flaw is the converse of the baseline flaw in the tax
expenditure budget. There, the argument goes, the baseline has been shaped by invisible, and
politically contestable, judgments about a “normal” tax system. In the regular, zeroexpenditure baseline budget, the authors have made no such judgments about a nonredistributive baseline expenditure pattern, but instead have left the judgments to readers.
Unfortunately, many of those readers, whether politicians or potential voters, will not realize
55

That is, they would unless (as seems likely) that the economy would disintegrate due to the absence
of effective governmental power; anarchy is not generally conducive to economic growth. The point of this
hypothetical is not to praise or condemn the no-government world, but to stress an often overlooked aspect of
tax payments and receipts.
56
It may well be impossible to get the same level of benefits through market provision due to free-rider
and other collective action problems endemic to the provision of public goods. Indeed, the need to overcome
such problems constitutes a standard justification for the existence of government. See MANCUR OLSON, supra
note 8, at 100.
57
See supra note 11 (defining “rent-seeking”). Alternatively, if not rent-seeking, such expenditures
could be analyzed as the outcome of legitimately contested governmental decisions.
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that such judgments must be made (let alone how to make them) to intelligently analyze the
information.
Relying on budget numbers can be misleading for another reason. The actual
beneficiaries of federal expenditures may well be someone other than the apparent
beneficiaries. To take an obvious (and well-known) example, the identity of the primary
beneficiary of Medicare is unclear. Is it the seniors who receive medical care they might not
have received otherwise—or doctors, who now have a much larger group of paying patients
to support their practices? Who benefits who benefits from subsidized federal student loans
to medical students—the students who take advantage of them, the universities (and their
employees) which rely on the existence of such loan programs when determining their
tuition schedules, or the future patients who gain from the presence of more doctors? Similar
ambiguity exists in the tax expenditure context. It is, for example, unclear whether the
deduction for home mortgage interest benefits home buyers (the apparent beneficiaries) or
home sellers (who can thereby charge higher prices for their homes) more. A reasonable
voter’s classification of the expenditure as “rent-seeking”, as merely violating their vision of
the public good, or of being good public policy may differ depending on the “real”
beneficiary of the government expenditure. In all of these cases (and many others), the
simple numbers provided in the federal budget are deceptive, appearing to convey more
information than they actually do.
As with tax expenditures, even if one felt reasonably comfortable with the operation
of the baseline(s), the categorization of particular expenditures as self-financed benefits or
general benefits or special benefits, a second, independent reason for suspicion of the
document exists: questions about the accuracy of the numbers put in the various categories.

B. The Numbers
Since the federal budget covers actual expenditures, expenditures from accounts
tracked by federal bureaucrats, one might think that (at least in relation to the zero baseline)
there could be nothing uncertain, nothing controversial, about the numbers found in the
budget. But one would be wrong, for two reasons. The first is the interrelationship between
various programs, the same sort of interrelationship that undermines the usefulness of the tax
expenditure budget. The other is the role of entitlement programs.
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Just as taxpayers who lose “their” tax expenditures may gravitate towards investment
in other tax-favored activities, individuals profiting from one governmental program may
migrate to another if their original program is shut down. As a result, the use of a zero
expenditure baseline to score the costs of such programs is misleading. The real cost is the
difference (if any) between the cost of the program and the cost of the replacement
program.58 For example, eliminating the Section 8 housing program is unlikely to save the
government the $17.5 billion stated cost of the program59 since the loss of section 8 benefits
will cause some of the benefited families to qualify for other forms of government benefits.
Likewise, farm subsidies—commonly lambasted as the result of pernicious rent-seeking,
reflecting the excessive electoral power of the farm interests—are less costly than the zero
baseline suggests. If such subsidies did not exist, at least some of those individuals currently
engaged in farming would exit the profession, undoubtedly damaging the businesses
formerly patronized by them. Perhaps they would abandon their communities altogether.
Though this string of events may well be efficient (and desirable) in the long run, in the
short-run, the dislocations would be significant—and the persons and businesses affected by
it undoubtedly would be partially subsidized by government aid. Such aid may come in the
form of food, housing and medical assistance and vocational training programs for displaced
farmers and others in the transitional period; it may come from federal contributions to
infrastructure projects (such as roads and sewer systems) necessitated by the consequent
demographic shifts. Those costs could be substantial. One could find similar linkages among
other programs. Were Medicaid expenditures reduced, leading some to forgo medical care,
one suspects that social security disability payments would increase as the unmitigated
consequences of health problems drove people from the work force. 60 Like the revenue
losses associated with particular tax expenditure provisions on the tax expenditure budget,
the expenditures figures attributed to with particular programs on the federal budget likely
overestimate the amount to be saved through the program’s elimination.
Another source of inaccuracy in the federal budget (at least, viewed prospectively)
comes from the fact that not all programs are funded by a flat dollar amount. Some very
large federal programs are “entitlement” programs; the authorizing statutes guarantee
benefits to all those meeting the programs’ qualifications. Entitlement programs include
Medicare, Medicaid, unemployment insurance, food stamps61—and the payment of interest
on the federal debt, to name just a few. When constructing the budget, officials estimate the
amount of such expenditures. However, as they are the first to admit, these estimations
58

Of course, the same argument can be made to minimize the amount of dead-weight loss generated by
rent-seeking, monopolization and other economically harmful phenomenon. See
59
2003 BUDGET, supra note 6, at 184.
60
Similar criticisms have been leveled against the revenue estimates contained in tax expenditure
budgets. See Bruce Bartlett, supra note 4, at 417-18; Boris Bittker, supra note 4, at 247.
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depend on the accuracy of economic projections, projections which often prove inaccurate.62
Some inaccuracy is inevitable, given that economics is not an exact science and unexpected
events can intervene. However, politics also can play a role in deciding upon the underlying
economic assumptions. The party in power often stands accused of picking assumptions to
generate budgetary results in line with its political agenda.63 And although at year’s end, the
executive has to publish (as part of the following year’s budget) a comparison of actual to
estimated totals, that does little to separate truly unexpected from predictable deviations,
deviations masked by the party in power to further its legislative agenda.
C. The Baseline Problem in Equal Outflow/Expenditure Budgets
These limitations of the zero baseline budget have been implicitly recognized by
those who have tried to use another method, another baseline, to determine whether regions
of the country (including states) have been treated fairly. They compare the tax revenues
collected from each region or state to federal expenditures made within the same area.64 The
implicit (and often explicit) assumption is that each region or state should receive its—and
only its—money back in the form of federal expenditures on public services. When judged
against this baseline of equal tax outflows and expenditure inflows, it appears that some
regions and states profit at the expense of others.65 Whether the differences in treatment can
be explained by variations in political power and bare-knuckled rent-seeking, as some
contend, or results from social welfare maximizing decisions is less clear. Indeed, as
explained below, this equal inflows and outflows baseline, like the zero-expenditure
baseline, can be misleading as often as it is helpful even on the narrower issue of whether
any redistribution is occurring.
In the first place, the location of an expenditure may not be a particularly good proxy
for the location of the expenditure’s intended or actual beneficiaries. Thus, the equal tax
61

2002 BUDGET, supra note 1, at 324.
See id., at 4-5.
63
See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 54 (2000) (“The
assumptions are where political opportunism and manipulation thrive.”).
64
See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2001,
at 312 (Table No. 470); JAY H. WALDER & HERMAN B. LEONARD, THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE STATES:
FISCAL YEAR 1999 at 4 (24th ed. 2000) (table 1); Lynn A Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An
Institution Whose Time Has Gone?, 13 J. L. & POLITICS 21, 39-40 (1997) (Tables 2 & 3).
65
See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 64, at 312 (“Each state runs a balance of
payments surplus or deficit with the federal government. Put another way, each state indirectly subsidizes or is
being subsidized by the other states.”); Wayne King, Sun Belt Renews Battle over Federal Funds, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 1987, at D-19 (learning of a study showing disparity between federal revenues collected and expended
in region, “a coalition of Southern lawmakers vowed today to wield their legislative power to send more money
southward”); Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Yes, New Yorkers Pick Up Tab for Other States, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
1995, at A22.
62
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outflows and expenditure inflows baseline may underestimate or overestimate the actual
match of tax burdens and government benefits. For example, taxpayers in the east surely
benefit from federal expenditures on western national parks and forests.66 They will also
benefit from the construction of a nuclear waste depository in Nevada. Indeed, it would be
ludicrous to contend that the relative “overfinancing” of Nevada (relative to New York, say)
that will result from what promise to be massive federal expenditures on that repository
indicates the success of rent-seeking behavior by Nevada.67 More generally, it would seem
wrong to imply that Massachusetts is profiting from rent-seeking merely because
Massachusetts-based companies happen to be the low bidders on an inordinately high
number of lucrative (or at least expensive) federal contracts.68
This would not be a problem if all states or regions naturally received approximately
the same ratio of generally beneficial expenditures relative to their tax collections. However,
there is no reason to assume such a convenient state of affairs exists, and some to suspect it
does not. The location of many general benefit expenditures are geographically determined.
For example, naval bases have to be built near good harbors on large, navigable bodies of
water. If, for strategic reasons, Congress decides to emphasize building up the navy rather
than the army, coastal states will appear to benefit in expenditure terms at the expense of
inland states. But it would be unreasonable to treat those facts as evidence of the relative
mistreatment of Iowa unless one is prepared to attack the bona fides of the decision to build
up the Navy, as opposed to, say, the air force.69 Nor does Iowa have any natural features
comparable to those found in, say, Wyoming, limiting the desirability of federal spending on
national parks in that state. And there appears to be only one Yucca Mountain.
Another approach would be to amend the tax and expenditure comparisons by first
removing all “general” benefits and associated tax revenues from the calculations. However,
there is no more prospect of reaching agreement on the list of “general benefits” (let alone
how to allocate the costs of those benefits among states’ tax revenues) than on the list of tax
expenditures. Should expenditures on the space program be regarded as benefiting merely
the states in which related expenditures are made (primarily Florida and Texas, where the
66

But see Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, supra note 64, at 41 n. 63 (arguing federal wealth
redistribution to western states not justified by disproportionate federal ownership of western lands).
67
Nevada’s populace and politicians vehemently oppose the construction of a Nevada depository;
however, everyone else is happy to have it located outside their state. See John J. Fialka, Nuclear-Plant
Neighbors Lobby For Yucca, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2002, at A4.
68
Unless, of course, one can make a case that letting the contracts in the first instance resulted from
rent-seeking behavior. Such behavior is hardly unknown; it is widely acknowledged that political rather than
military concerns undergird some of the decisions regarding the purchase of some weapons systems.
69
Of course, if the navy programs could be carried out equally well in any one of several coastal states,
one might expect to see those states engaging in rent-seeking behavior. See supra note 11 (defining rentseeking).
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space stations are located), or all states? And what about farm subsidies, which to many are
the archetype rent-seeking success? A case can be made for the desirability, at a national
level, of maintaining domestic food-producing capacity as a hedge against a variety of
foreign disasters, and farm-state legislators regularly make it. Nor are they alone in trying to
clothe “pork” in the mantle of “the national interest”. Virtually all spending programs are
marketed to Congress and the public as being in the public interest, rather than as
unprincipled grabs on the federal treasury.70
In sum, the problems identified in the tax expenditure budget have equally serious
counterparts in the regular federal budget and its variants. No budget document provides as
much useful information as one might hope; each is susceptible precisely to the political
manipulation and misinterpretation it is supposed to constrain or illuminate. Nor is
substantial improvement possible. Most of the identified flaws are inherent in the
instruments.
Given these flaws in the information used by the public to inform them about the
activity of their elected and appointed officials, the persistence and effectiveness of rentseeking behavior (as well as, perhaps, the general phenomenon of voter apathy) is hardly
surprising. Nor can we expect perfection from political actors acting on the basis of such
imperfect information. But the point of this discussion is not to bemoan the existence of
imperfections in our democratic system. It is instead to put the flaws inherent in the tax
expenditure budget in context. The discussion is meant to highlight the fact that these flaws
are no worse than those prevailing in another data set that we rely upon to guide our political
analysis and determine our voting patterns, and which no one would suggest should be
eliminated. Having decided that some information is better than none in that context, to be
consistent, we should make the same decision when it comes to the tax expenditure budget.
At some point, numbers may be so unreliable as to be worthless, but judging from related
contexts, those found in the tax expenditure budget do not deserve that categorization. And
once that point is accepted, it becomes possible to suggest that the issue should not be
whether the tax expenditure budget device should be retained, but rather whether we should
be adding to the list of imperfect information devices readily available for public inspection.
Is it now time to require the addition of a “regulatory budget” to the annual budget
publication?
IV. The Case for a Regulatory Budget

70

See supra note 17.
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The difficulties with composing the tax expenditure budget do not undercut Surrey’s
original insight, that subsidies can be delivered through the tax system as effectively as
through direct government spending, and that intelligent law-making and voting requires
taking both types of subsidies into account. From a recipient’s point of view, it makes no
difference whether a government bestows a $1000 check or excuses the recipient from
paying $1000 in taxes by promulgating a favorable tax rule. Instead, the problem with
Surrey’s analysis was that it stopped too soon; he should have added government regulation
as an alternative method for delivering $1000 payments to favored interests. From a
recipient’s point of view, what matters is the bottom line: whether it is $1000 richer in the
end. The method by which the $1000 is delivered is irrelevant. At least, it is a matter of
indifference for the recipient; as detailed below, it may make a substantial difference to the
rest of society because the choice of delivery mechanism may have efficiency effects. It is
because of those effects on society that we should be wary of structuring the political system
to make one delivery mechanism more attractive than the others.
A. The Substitution Effect
One of the justifications for publication of the tax expenditure budget was that, in its
absence, legislators could grant privileges to special interest groups without their
constituents’ knowledge, and essentially beyond their oversight.71 The argument originally
went further: Surrey believed that legislators were unaware of the benefits being provided to
these special interest groups.72 The hope was that inclusion of the tax expenditure budget in
the federal budget document would force both legislators and the public to scrutinize tax
rules as carefully as direct expenditure provisions, and end what seemed to be a drift towards
increased use of this under-the-table method of catering to rent-seekers and others.73
Although the introduction of the tax expenditure budget did not markedly succeed in
lowering the growth of tax expenditures,74 tax expenditure provisions now seem to be
receiving as much political scrutiny and oversight as direct spending programs.75
71

See Jonathan Barry Forman, supra note 20, at 538 (“Politicians could emphasize the sharply
progressive statutory tax rates when they spoke to average citizens. At the same time they granted high-income
constituents so many special provisions that virtually nobody paid tax at those high marginal rates.”); Edward
A. Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 1168 (“...such subsidies, undisclosed in the federal budget, were not subject to the
same scrutiny as direct monetary expenditures...”).
72
See Stanley S. Surrey, supra note 20, at 730 (tax incentives “not comprehended within the
Government.... No one really knew what was being spent through the tax system or for what purposes.”);
Jonathan Barry Forman, supra note 20, at 541-542 (...[Weidenbaum] testified before the Subcommittee on
Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, in an effort to make Congress aware of the many
ways that the government subsidized the private sector through a variety of off-budget mechanisms.”).
73
See Stanley E. Surrey, supra note 20, at 737-738.
74
The baseline problem resurfaces—it is impossible to know to what degree, if at all, publication of the
tax expenditure budget constrained the growth of tax expenditures because we do not know what would have
happened in its absence. However, the received wisdom is that the budget had at most a limited impact on the
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But this increase in transparency may not have improved overall government
accountability or manageability. Transparency with respect to tax code provisions provides
only a glimpse into darkness so long as regulatory rules are nontransparent. It is possible
that, to the extent the tax expenditure budget has been effective in tempering at least the most
outrageous in interest group grabs76 in the tax arena, all it has really succeeded in doing is
diverting those efforts to other subsidy delivery mechanisms subject to less political scrutiny
by legislators and voters. In particular, if a special interest group has enough political power
to obtain a $1000 subsidy, and if obtaining it through a tax subsidy becomes more difficult as
a political matter because of the publication of the tax expenditure budget, it may go instead
for a favorable regulatory ruling, one which reduces its costs by $1000.77 After all, $1000 is
$1000, no matter the method of delivery. Such redirection is plausible because, although
many if not most of regulatory rulings are “public” in the sense that they have to be
published in publicly available agency documents, these documents are less widely
distributed and in less accessible form than the annual federal budget document. No central
compilation of agency actions and associated costs exists, let alone is published, distributed
and read on an annual basis as is the federal budget document.
Thus, to the extent the tax expenditure budget has any effect on the overall level of
tax expenditures, it may be redirecting rent-seeking rather than reducing its total. And
unfortunately for us all, it is likely that that redirection will make us all worse off. The next
section explains why.
B. Why Redirection Matters

continued growth in tax expenditures. See Jonathan Barry Forman, supra note20, at 545 n.67 (“Nevertheless,
tax expenditures continue to grow at a much faster rate than appropriations.”); Gene Steurle, Some Thoughts on
the Status of Tax Expenditures, 68 TAX NOTES 485, 485 (1995); Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and
Constitutional Decisions, 50 HASTINGS L. J. 407, 408 (1999) (Internal Revenue Code “has apparently become
the vehicle of choice for disbursing government funds). Nonetheless, the steady chorus of attacks on the tax
expenditure budget leads to the suspicion that it has at least a marginal effect on behavior.
75
See Edward A. Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 1194. The mechanisms through which this scrutiny takes
place remains somewhat separate from those overseeing direct expenditures, much to the discomfort of some
analysts who, like Surrey, would prefer a more functionally unified budgetary process. See, e.g., Victor
Thuronyi, supra note 4, at 1192; Mary L. Heen, Reinventing Tax Expenditure Reform: Improving Program
Oversight under the Government Performance and Results Act, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 751, 789-90 (2000).
76
Such “grabs” may be characterized as “rent-seeking” or contested policy judgments, depending on
one’s political proclivities.
77
I do not mean to suggest that such regulatory alternatives are available in all situations. Indeed,
practical and political impediments may make regulatory initiatives impossible. But as the amount of
government regulation increases, so too do the opportunities for regulatory favoritism. See JAMES BUCHANAN &
GORDON TULLOCK, supra note 8, at 286-87.
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Although all methods of paying $1000 may be equal from the point of view of the
special interest recipient of government largesse, they may not be equivalent from the
perspective of others in the society, either those who finance the payment or those who are
secondarily affected by the payment. Consider the example of steel subsidies. In recent
years, the steel industry has been in financial trouble. According to the steel manufacturers,
its problems stem from its inability to charge prices high enough to cover its costs—not its
operating costs, but its fixed costs. Although its operating costs, the companies claim, are
low enough to survive competition, they have been hobbled by their obligation to provide
medical benefits to a large cadre of former steelworkers. Those costs could be “avoided”
were the companies to declare bankruptcy, but both shareholders and former employees
would suffer from such a course of action. From the steel industry’s point of view, having
the government assume those costs is far preferable. But how could those costs be assumed?
Several alternatives exist, each of which has different social and distributional implications.
The government could simply give the steel companies enough money to pay retiree health
costs, or agree to put those retirees under a federal health insurance plan. Doing so would
spread the cost of the subsidy over all U.S. taxpayers. So too would a tax expenditure,
provided by an exceptionally generous depreciation rule for steel-making equipment, for
example. The imposition of a tariff, by contrast, shifts the burden to consumers of steel who
are forced to pay higher prices for their purchases. Were the payment to be made in the form
of relaxed environmental rules or enforcement of existing rules, the payment would come
from those affected by the resulting pollution; it would be exacted in the form of higher
medical costs, and lower or more unpleasant life expectancies. This raises an obvious
fairness issue, as between one burdened group and another. But beyond the fairness issue is a
larger efficiency concern: the total costs inflicted as a result of either a tariff or a relaxation
of pollution standards may exceed the social costs that would have been created had
Congress just paid the desired amount of money directly, in a cash grant, or provided an
equivalent amount of tax relief. Both of these concerns are further elaborated below.
1. Fairness Concerns
The choice of subsidy mechanism may determine where the economic burden of the
subsidy will be placed. Appearances in this regard may be deceiving, however; the burden
may be reallocated before the fact, as part of a trade-off in the legislative process, and after
the fact, through the movement of prices and behavior in our market economy. Thus, the
difference between subsidy mechanisms from a fairness perspective may be more apparent
than real; at any rate, it is more complicated than ordinarily envisioned.
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It is tempting to assert that direct expenditures and tax expenditures distribute costs
in the “fairest” fashion.78 Direct expenditures are paid out of general taxes, which have been
collected from the population based on criteria that have survived the scrutiny of the political
process; a very large part are financed by taxes ostensibly levied based on the contributor’s
(taxpayer’s) “ability to pay”; to the extent the need to make such expenditures generates an
increased need for government revenues, those increases will be financed through agreed
upon rate increases levied on the “ability to pay” base. Although there are many disputes
about how well the actual tax systems live up to that stated goal, no other funding
mechanism even attempts to attain that goal; it would be surprising if they came closer to
achieving it. Similarly, when it comes to tax expenditures, to the extent one analogizes them
to subsidies, the same would be true. If one thought of them solely in terms of their effect in
depressing revenues, the analysis would be virtually the same. The existence of the
expenditures requires Congress to raise general tax rates to generate enough revenue to meet
the governments spending priorities.
By contrast, regulation imposes burdens on those being regulated and the parties
dealing with them. Raising production costs may inflate prices of the goods or services being
produced, as well as depress output. Though in some cases these regulatory costs should be
viewed as leading to the proper internalization of social costs of production, in other cases
the regulation may be over or under-compensatory. For example, critics of the Endangered
Species Act and other land preservation laws routinely argue that it leaves a few
landowners—the last to develop—bearing the cost of an entire region’s habitat loss. 79
Likewise, the Americans with Disabilities Act leaves some employers with quite expensive
“accommodation” responsibilities even in the absence of a causal link between the
employment relationship and an employee’s disability. Because these expenses are
discontinuous as between employers, very often the result is a transfer of wealth from the
employer to the employee.80

78

Here one runs into the ubiquitous baseline problem once again. One cannot determine the “fairest”
method of funding without some underlying conception of what “fairness” entails. Although some contend that
“fairness” requires linking tax burdens to government benefits, the difficulties involved in determining who
benefits from public goods leads many others to believe that “fairness” requires linking tax burdens to “ability
to pay.” The two conceptions of fairness can obviously conflict, although perhaps not as often as some fear,
given that those with relatively high incomes generally derive relatively high benefits from operating within a
stable governmental structure. To put the same thought another way, the government may matter more to a
merchant than a subsistence farmer.
79
See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and
Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 346 (1997); David A. Dana, Natural Preservation and the Race to Develop,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 656 (1995) (arguing this feature leads to accelerated development of land).
80
See Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination With A Difference: Can Employment
Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans With Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C.L. REV. 307, 344-45 (2001).
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However, this broad brush approach likely overstates the difference between direct
payments, tax expenditures, and regulation, at least under current law. Under the budget
procedures now in effect, Congress and the President do not establish new tax rates each
year based on the desired expenditures for the year. That is, their baseline reference is not a
budget of zero and tax rates of zero.81 Rather, they start with an overall budgetary target
largely based on the prior year’s experience, and try to keep spending within that range. As a
result, whether talking direct expenditures or tax expenditures, because different proposals
compete for the same pot of funds, the “economic burden” of any particular expenditure item
most properly can be described as falling on the recipients of the proposal(s) squeezed out
(or left un-enacted) to create room for the programs that are funded. This may always have
been true, but it has become painfully obvious under the current budget procedure.
The current procedure82 begins with the President; he drafts a budget which is
forwarded to the houses of Congress.83 There, separate House and Senate budget committees
draft budget resolutions84 (which may or may not have correspond to the President’s
budget),85 which are eventually reconciled and passed in the form of a concurrent resolution.
These resolutions set the broad outlines of the budget by establishing revenue and
expenditure targets both for the federal government as a whole and for a number of different
functional subdivisions of that government.86 The budget is split into two parts for purposes
of these resolutions. The first part covers discretionary spending programs that receive
periodic, usually annual, appropriations, and the second part covers direct spending
programs and tax provisions that typically remain in effect until repealed.87 The resolutions
set a spending cap for the discretionary portion of the budget while the direct spending
portion is limited by “PAYGO,” which requires a revenue or direct spending offset for any
revenue or direct spending legislation "that increases the deficit in any fiscal year.”88
Starting in 1997, the discretionary portion of the budget was divided further between
defense and non-defense expenditures, and then again into portions that corresponded to the

81

Although such “zero-based-budgeting” has its advocates, it has been rejected because “these budget
processes challenge human limitations, requiring lawmakers to consider vast numbers of factors in designing
programs and allocating resources to them.” Elizabeth Garrett, supra note 42, at 392-93.
82
The current budget process was enacted by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act
of 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codified at 2 U.S.C. ' 601 (200 ). Many of the most noted
features of that process, however, were added by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. See ALLEN SCHICK,
supra note 63, at 23-24 & Figure 2-5 (BEA created discretionary funding caps and PAYGO rules).
83
See ALLEN SCHICK, supra note 63, at 74.
84
See id. at 117.
85
See id. at 105.
86
See id.
87
See Elizabeth Garrett, supra note 42, at 398.
88
See id. at 400.
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jurisdiction of the thirteen appropriations subcommittees.89 The appropriate appropriations
subcommittee then decides how to spend the money allocated to its purview.90 To survive to
enactment, a subsidy proposal must have successfully competed for limited funds against all
other discretionary programs within the jurisdiction of a particular subcommittee; even
before that, the subcommittee must have won the competition for such funds among all other
potential committees, and the discretionary budget as a whole must have been allocated
funds at the expense of the defense budget. Realistically, subsidy proponents generally have
to identify offsetting savings in other discretionary expenditures; in the words of one
commentator, they must adopt the role of “funding predators.”91
The rules for tax expenditures are different in form but similar in substance. Though
the baselines for revenue and expenditure amounts are derived from current law rather than
artificial spending caps, supporters of new tax expenditures also have to locate offsets to
meet the PAYGO requirements. Proponents of tax expenditures appear to have more offset
options than did proponents of subsidies. Because most tax and entitlement measures fall
within the purview of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance committees, the offset
options available to proponents of new expenditures are not limited to a subset of programs
related loosely by subject matter.92 Proponents of new tax expenditures for education could
try to fund them by cutting back on favorable agricultural tax provisions.
However, the difference between tax expenditures and subsidies is less clear than it
first appears. Nothing keeps subsidy proponents from targeting unrelated offset options
earlier in the allocation process. For example, proponents of a new education program could
try to convince members of the budget committees to reduce funds allocated for agricultural
subsidies to allow for an increase in educational funds. If successful at that level, they would
have to prevail a second time, at the subcommittee level, because they would have to
convince members of the education subcommittee to allocate those new funds to their
particular program. But proponents of tax expenditures face a similar two-step burden.
Supporters of one new tax expenditure could and did poach offset proposals promulgated by
proponents of another tax expenditure. Thus, it is not enough for proponents of a particular
tax expenditure to successfully target an offset opportunity; they too have to convince the
relevant committee to dedicate the cost/revenue savings to their cause. It is not unusual for
89

Id. at 398-99.
See ALLEN SCHICK, supra note 63 at 114.
91
See Elizabeth Garrett, supra note 42, at 399-400. “Emergency” spending is exempt from the caps,
and thus from the search for offsetting costs. The lack of criteria or assessments for designating spending as
“emergency” allows it to be used as a “significant loophole.” See ALLEN SCHICK, supra note 63, at 62. Over the
years, Congress has designated many routine and foreseeable expenditures (such as the cost of the decennial
census) as “emergencies”. Id.
92
See id. at 401.
90
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proponents of a particular tax expenditure to win the first battle only to see the new funding
capacity directed towards a different tax expenditure.93 Such an outcome obviously makes it
harder to obtain the desired tax expenditure, in that it forces the proponents to come up with
yet another offset suggestion.
Ultimately, then, both forms of government aid require proponents to survive
challenges by both distant and close competitors in a two-step process. And, most
importantly for these purposes, success comes at a price in terms of squeezing out some
other claimant for government largesse—a claimant who may lack political clout rather than
social merit, and in any case, is likely to be totally unrelated to the new beneficiaries. In
short, when looking at who really (as opposed to theoretically) funds direct expenditures and
tax expenditures, those sources may not be any more “fair” (in terms of a general “ability to
pay” conception of fairness or in terms of being proper internalizers of social harms created
by an activity) than are the sources “funding” regulation.
The Senate recently voted to extend these budget rules for six months beyond their
September 30, 2002 expiration date.94 Whether they remain in place beyond the new March,
2003 deadline remains to be seen. If these rules are replaced, the new budget procedure may
bring the process closer to the more simplified (and presumptively fair) distribution of costs
than the current procedure. Or it may not; only time will tell whether future budget or tax
processes will provide differential levels of “fairness.”
Though at present and perhaps in the future, there might not be much to choose from
on the fairness issue, the same cannot be said about the efficiency issue. One cannot
generalize and say that tax expenditures or direct spending always creates less deadweight
loss than regulation. However, one can say that generally speaking, the different funding
mechanisms have different behavioral effects, raising different efficiency concerns. The
government should take these concerns into account when choosing between the different
funding mechanisms. Procedural requirements that “stack the deck” in favor of one
mechanism over another unwisely reduce the impact of these concerns in the political
calculus.
2. Efficiency Concerns

93

See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax
Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 524-25 (1998) (noting “no enforceable property rights in its
discovery....[of] a weakly defended target to use as an offset”).
94
Warren Rojas, Senate OKs Six-Month Extension Of Budget Enforcement Tools, 97 TAX NOTES 321,
321 (2002).
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The deadweight loss associated with tax levies is a well-explored economic topic. As
tax rates rise, taxpayers change their behavior: switching away from taxable activities (such
as work) to non-taxable activities (such as leisure), reconfiguring their taxable activities to
lower the effective tax rate, and the like. Economists even believe they can accurately
measure the amount of this distortion; they claim that the deadweight loss equals the square
of the tax rate.95 However, changes in the tax base (as opposed to tax rates) engender
different types of distortions that may not be measured as easily. For example, the addition
of the investment tax credit stimulated capital investment, often to the detriment of
investment in human capital and the use of labor generally. Tax expenditures function as
adjustments to the tax base. The precise distortions engendered by each depends on the
particular features of the tax provision. Excluding employer-provided health insurance from
income, for example, encourages employer-provided, as opposed to self-provided, health
insurance.96 It may—or may not—increase the total amount of purchased health insurance,
but even if it does, it does so at some cost in terms of the effects on job mobility and policy
design. Regulation also distorts behavior; indeed, that is usually the point of regulation. The
regulation may be “efficient” or distort behavior in desirable ways, or do the opposite.
Forcing paper mills to install antipollution equipment raises the cost of producing paper,
forcing users of paper to internalize the cost of the manufacturing process rather than
externalizing it onto those who live in the vicinity—or downstream or downwind—of the
paper mill in the form of ill health and unpleasant living conditions.
The choice between different funding techniques thus represents a choice among
different forms (and amounts) of distortion. Consider again the example of subsidies to the
steel industry. If the government’s only goal were to provide the steel industry with a stated
sum on money, say $30 million dollars, it could transfer the sum by writing a check on the
federal treasury. It could pay for the check either through higher taxes (increasing the
work/leisure distortion) or higher debt (perhaps leading to inflation, which would have its
own distorting effects). From the steel industry’s point of view, the money would keep some
operations in business that would have collapsed, to the benefit of their employees and
(particularly) their former employees and shareholders. Or it could enact a tax expenditure
95

See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORN. L. REV.
1627, 1650-1651, 1656 & fn. 122 (1999).
96
It has been suggested that this tax treatment is responsible for the development of our current,
unsatisfactory system of financing health care. See, e.g., Gene Steurle, The Case for a Tax Credit or Voucher
for Providing Health Care to the Nonelderly—Part Four: The Poor Design of Current Tax Preferences for
Employer-Provided Insurance, 52 TAX NOTES 1219 (1991). Others blame it for causing excessive spending on
medical services and contributing to health care inflation. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as
Insurance: The Casualty Loss and Medical Expense Deductions and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance
Premiums, 79 CALIF. L. REV.1485, 1497 (1991); Feldstein & Friedman, Tax Subsidies, The Rational Demand
for Insurance and the Health Care Crisis, 7 J. PUB. ECON. 155,176 (1977); Feldman & Dowd, A New Estimate
of the Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1991).
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favoring the steel industry—say, specially favorable depreciation rules for steel-making
equipment, which would encourage steel manufacturers to upgrade their equipment, helping
manufacturers of such equipment and possibly hurting those employed by or living in the
vicinity of some existing steel facilities. Or it could allow a special deduction for certain
types of research or development expenses that previously had to be capitalized, which in
addition to conferring benefits to the companies with respect to their pre-existing research
programs would likely lead to an expansion of those programs at the expense of some other
capital projects, such as equipment upgrades. The current plan provides for a tariff to
encourage domestic steel purchasers to purchase domestically produced steel. The
guaranteed market undoubtedly will have some impact on producers’ behavior. It will allow
them to charge higher prices, and perhaps to avoid necessary restructuring in the way they do
business. It will also adversely impact domestic users of steel, who (if competing against
producers from other countries purchasing steel at lower world prices) may decide to move
more of their operations abroad. One result of sugar price supports has been the decimation
of the American candy industry. Domestic steel workers may save their jobs at the expense
of domestic workers in steel products, just as domestic sugar growers saved theirs at the
expense of domestic candy makers.
Nor are these farm and steel industries isolated examples of places where the
government essentially has a choice of how to deliver its largesse. Additional scenarios
abound. Mining companies can obtain (and at various points of time, have obtained)
government support through direct subsidies, favorable tax rules, or the weakening of
environmental regulation. So, too, have the nation’s railroads, utility producers, and a host of
manufacturing enterprises.
The point is not that one set of distortions is necessarily smaller or better than the
other (though one might be), only that they are different and that those differences should be
taken into account when deciding between the alternative courses of action. If procedural
restrictions make one course of action less attractive than its alternatives—perhaps because
the course is subject to much more public or even Congressional disclosure than the other -then these procedural considerations will play a larger role in the political process and
efficiency concerns a correspondingly smaller role. If one believes that governments should
be encouraged to choose the most efficient methods accomplishing their ends, this seems to
be problematic.
At first blush, this concern suggests that the tax expenditure budget may be worse
than useless. Publishing such a budget focuses legislative and public attention on (and the
concomitant political fall-out from) benefits delivered to special interest groups through this
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mechanism. Although the intended effect was to diminish the overall amount of such
payments, it may instead just divert these payments to another mechanism where they will be
less politically visible. Coupling the questionable effects on the overall amount of interest
group payments with the likelihood of efficiency losses generated by the need to funnel these
payments into a more limited choice of delivery mechanism suggests that the tax expenditure
budget does more harm than good. But further reflection suggests that this is the wrong
message.
V. Combating Redirection: Regulatory Budgets?
If, in fact, the public exposure created by the creation and publication of the tax
expenditure budget decreases the ability of special interest groups or minority interests to
obtain that form of governmental favoritism, it may redirect much of the political pressure to
other, less visible—and possibly less efficient—arenas such as government regulation.
Restoration of “information parity” between tax expenditures and government regulations by
eliminating the tax expenditure budget may well limit some of this redirection. But the result
will still be far from the desired level playing field between delivery mechanisms because
one, government expenditures, will remain subject to a higher level of public exposure.
Indeed, if one takes the parity argument seriously, one would have to advocate ceasing
publication of the entire federal budget.
There is another alternative. Any level of scrutiny can be consistent with the goal of
achieving parity between the various rent-seeking opportunities. All that is required is that
the various opportunities be subjected to the same level of scrutiny. Instead of reducing
scrutiny of tax expenditures, we could increase opportunities for public scrutiny of
regulation and enforcement decisions. A concerted effort could be made to more effectively
disseminate information regarding regulatory initiatives, both legislative and administrative,
in a manner similar to or even in conjunction with the dissemination of information
regarding tax and direct expenditures. Such dissemination would relieve interested members
of the public or their representatives in the press of the burden of tracking down such
information on a bill, by bill, regulation by regulation basis.97 The General Accounting
97

Much of the information discussed in the next section already exists, because it is required to be
gathered as part of agency decision-making processes. See Tan 98–99. Much is already in the public domain.
However, it is available in scattered and sometimes truncated form. One has to know what one is looking for to
find it. The same was true of at least some of the tax expenditure material prior to the early 70s. Treasury would
provide the information (at least to legislators) upon request; after 1968 a complete budget could be found in
Treasury reports. See note 23 supra. And beginning in 1972, the House Ways and Means Committee began
publishing those reports in its committee publications. Id. But proponents of the Tax Expenditure Budget were
not satisfied with this level of disclosure was insufficient and continued to push for its inclusion in the more
widely circulated federal budget document. See Tan 22–24.
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Office or Office of Management and Budget could be entrusted with the task of maintaining
a central repository of such information, with lists of the different regulations, their
associated costs and benefits, cross-referenced by affected interest groups. The annual
publication of a “regulatory budget” as part of the annual budget document would provide
Congress and the public with much more information about the strength of interest groups
than it has now. For example, Congress and the public would have a much better idea of the
power exerted by the oil industry if it could obtain not only the federal budget and the tax
expenditure budget, but also the effect of rulings by administrative agencies such as OSHA,
the EPA, BLM and the like. But what would such a budget look like?
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Government regulation, whether imposed by legislation or agency action, can have
profound behavioral consequences, with concomitant financial impacts. It often shifts costs
from one party to another, or at the very least, changes the form in which those costs are
imposed. For example, anti-pollution rules may impose costs on manufacturers while
benefiting members of the air-breathing, water-drinking public, who, in the absence of
regulation, would have suffered some combination of filtering, medical and health costs. Of
course, much if not all of the costs imposed on manufacturers may be passed through to
consumers in the form of higher prices for the products they produce; to the extent those
consumers consist of members of the air-breathing, water-drinking public, the costs will
have shifted only in form—though if the regulation is efficient, the total of such costs should
be somewhat lower as a result of the regulation. But regulation, like direct expenditures, can
be the focus of rent-seeking, in both directions. Governments can regulate too much or too
little at the behest of special interest groups. The question is how to tell if—and just as
importantly, how to communicate to the general public when—it is doing either. That is, on
what basis can one monitor regulatory moves in the search for undue influence?
The desire to come up with a mechanism for monitoring the activities of
administrative agencies is as old as such agencies. In recent years, most politicians and
academics have focused on cost-benefit analysis.98 Some have suggested requiring agencies
to publish on an annual basis, the costs and benefits of regulations put in place during that
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See, e.g., Robert H. Frank and Cass. R. Sunstein, Cost Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV. 323, 323-24 (2001) (cost-benefit analysis generally accepted by Congress, courts and the
executive); Robert H. Frank, Why is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 913 (2000);
Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29
J. LEG. STUD. 1105 (2000); Gary S. Becker, A Comment on the Conference on Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEG.
STUD. 1149 (2000); Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 971
(2000) .
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year.99 Others have suggested that agencies be granted annual “budgets” demarcated in terms
of costs (or net costs) imposed by regulation.100 But while tabulations of the costs and
benefits of regulations may be valuable for some purposes (including serving as an internal
limit on interest group capture101), they are far from perfect for purposes of determining the
extent of agency influence for two reasons. One has to do with inherent defects in the
construction of cost-budget analyses; the other is that special interest influence may be
reflected by the absence of regulations, rather than their existence.
1. The Numbers, Again
A cost benefit analysis requires the estimation of two numbers: costs and benefits.
Unfortunately for all concerned, such numbers are often difficult to estimate accurately.
Sometimes the problem lies in the non-monetary nature of perceived costs and
benefits. For example, a substantial literature has developed over the question of how to
value a human life.102 Controversies have also arisen over the value of biodiversity, pristine
scenery, and clean air and water. Estimates of costs of compliance have also proven to be
unreliable as the development of new technology or simply new approaches using old
technology often brings them far below original projections.103

99

There has already been some movement in this direction. The Regulatory Accountability Provision of
1996 requires the director of the OMB to provide Congress with estimates of the total annual benefits and costs
of all federal regulatory programs as well as individual regulations; such reports were produced in 1997, 1998
and 2000. Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 29 J. LEG. STUD.
873, 892 (2000); see generally Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive
Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2001) (“Bills requiring agencies to use costbenefit analysis have been routinely proposed in Congress since 1995. Some federal regulatory statutes already
require it and many more are interpreted to allow it.”).
100
See Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Net Benefit Accounts: A Thought Experiment, U. PA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2002).
101
See Gary S. Becker, supra note 98, at 1152 (“Cost-benefit analysts ....can influence political
outcomes by making enough voters aware of the true effects of different policies.”); Matthew D. Adler and Eric
A. Posner, supra note 98, at 1141 (cost-benefit analysis “forces agencies to be clear about the basis of their
decisions, and this facilitates monitoring by other actors”).
102
See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, supra note 98, at 1141 & Appendix Tables A1 and
A2 (listing different valuations for human life and discount rates used by agencies); John Broome, Cost-Benefit
Analysis and Population, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 953 (2000); W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 843, 845853 (2000) (describing empirical studies); John D. Graham & James W. Vaupel, The Value of a Life: What
Difference Would It Make?, 1 RISK ANALYSIS 89-95 (1981).
103
See Winston Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern, and Peter Nelson, On the Accuracy of Regulatory
Cost Estimates 16-18, Resources for the Future Discussion Paper (Jan. 1999), available online at
http://www.rff.org/disc_papers/1999.htm (visited June 24, 2002) (finding that agencies frequently overestimate
costs because of technological innovations). Indeed, very early on, scholars suggested adopting “technologyforcing” regulations that would spur the development of cost-reducing technologies. See Bruce Ackerman and
William Hassler, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).
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Further, one cannot make the comfortable assumption that the resulting errors will be
randomly distributed. The uncertainties involved in generating these numbers opens
opportunities for interest groups to affect outcomes. In the absence of generally agreed upon
market guidelines, an agency has to rely on expert opinion to determine the value of costs
and benefits. Often, these experts hold wildly varying opinions; the agency has to decide
how to reconcile the unreconcilable, or choose to pay attention to one and dismiss the
other.104 Allegations of improper influence are far from infrequent (though generally
unproven). But the point remains: an agency-produced cost-benefit analysis may reflect
interest group capture rather than reveal its existence.
The numbers on their face, then, may be less than revealing of the desired
information. But even if the numbers could be trusted, any compendium of cost-benefit
analyses of adopted regulations would be a radically incomplete measure of interest group
influence because such influence may take the form of refusing to regulate or otherwise
intervene as well as the actual issuance of rules.
2. The Non-Interference Alternative
Just as Congress may grant financial favors to a few by not taxing them, agencies
may grant favors by not regulating activities which “should” be regulated, i.e. where a
regulation would be justified if judged solely on cost-benefit grounds.105 For example, an
agency may have the power, under the prevailing statute, to forbid a certain mining
technique on grounds that it pollutes watersheds, and, because of interest group pressure,
decide not to issue such a regulation thus allowing the destructive mining process to proceed.
But a compendium of the costs and benefits of regulations that have been issued would
completely miss that type of favoritism. Nor, unfortunately, can one simply publish a table
outlining the differences between the “socially optimum” set of regulations and those
actually in force (or enacted in a given year) since the definition of that social optimum
would be controversial, to say the least. Finally, the compilation or publication of differences
between U.S. and foreign regulations in a given area would not necessarily be helpful,
inasmuch as the foreign regulations may themselves have been influenced by (the same or
different) interest group concerns.

104

See Eric Posner, supra note 100, at 1146 (“the intangibles are significant enough to leave the agency
with wide discretion”)
105
See Peter L. Kahn, The Politics of Unregulation, 75 CORNELL L. REV.280, 284-85, 291-92, 312
(1990). One prominent empirical study suggests that interest groups are particularly effective in blocking
government action. See KAY L. SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 314-15, 395-96, 398 (1986).
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These criticisms of a unified cost-benefit analysis schedule are strongly reminiscent
of those leveled in earlier parts of this paper about the current federal budget document. The
pervasive nature of the baseline and measurement problems cannot be denied. On the other
hand, it is hard to believe that having this information readily available would make the
American press or public (or even legislators) less knowledgeable about the role played by
governmental institutions and less adequate to play their role in the governing process. The
real question, really, is whether this information is enough. It may well be desirable to gain a
second perspective on agency action, one which focuses as much on agency inaction as
positive action. Just as the tax expenditure budget points out the significance of “negative
collections” by the government, the “contact audit” described in the next section may shed
some light on the phenomenon of “negative regulation”, or decisions by agencies not to
regulate.
B. The Contact Audit
Coming up with a way intelligibly to present information about the influence of
interest groups on agency actions is important because it has the potential for reducing the
total amount of rent-seeking, as well as ensuring the efficient delivery of that which persists,
as well as informing the public about the content of government action in general. Standard
tools for monitoring agency actions, however, are only partially successful in accomplishing
this goal. Another approach may be helpful. One such approach is suggested by the recent
controversy regarding energy industry input into the energy deregulation rules:106 the
“contact audit” or “contact schedule.” Agencies could be required to report the
identity/affiliation, number and extent (perhaps measured by time) of contacts with nongovernmental representatives with respect to every regulatory procedure, whether it
culminated in the issuance of a regulation or not. A report card could then be constructed for
each such agency action (or inaction), containing the number of such contacts and the
interests they represented. At the very least, such lists would reveal the extent of special
interest concern about an issue; at best, it may encourage agencies to seek out alternative
viewpoints to avoid the embarrassment of appearing to make one-sided decisions—and
having heard those viewpoints, to make better decisions.
106

Vice-President Cheney chaired an energy tax force entrusted with the task of crafting the executive’s
energy deregulation policy. After the financial collapse of Enron, one of the major players in the energy and
energy-trading market, amid allegations of fraud and malfeasance, both the General Accounting Office and
Congress attempted to get information regarding contacts between Cheney, Enron and other energy industry
officials. The administration initially refused to provide this information, claiming executive privilege. After the
GAO filed suit to obtain the list of witnesses appearing before the energy tax force and a Senate committee
subpoenaed records of contacts between Enron and the White House, the information was released. See Eric
Herman, Government Releases Enron Info White House Acts Hours After Senate Subpoenas, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
, May 23, 2002 , at 67.
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Requiring the construction and publication of such schedules would not be without
problems. Deciding which members of the agency and which contacts should be reported
would be problematic. One would have to balance fears about routine avoidance of reporting
requirements with workload concerns—to say nothing of the possibilities for obscuring
information about substantive contacts by camouflaging them in a host of routine
transactions. For example, if contacts only had to be recorded after the initiation of a
regulatory procedure, it would not be surprising to see the formal initiation of such
procedures delayed until the agency was farther along in its deliberative process.107
Alternatively, lobbyists might attempt to influence Congressional officials or staff members,
both as to underlying substance and also the need to lean on agency personnel. Such indirect
influence may leave few obvious fingerprints. And to the extent the contact audit is effective
in collecting and promulgating relevant information, one would have to accept the possibility
that the information may be used to increase interest group power, by enabling group
members to better monitor attempts at free-riding and other forms of misbehavior by each
other.108
Further, the information provided would be less than a perfect proxy for interest
group capture: many instances of one-sided representation could be explained as reflecting
the fact that some would be helped but no one would be hurt by the adoption (or nonpromulgation) of the rule under consideration. And special interests may prevail even in a
hard-fought situation, where many opponents had their say. However, one can hope that it
will forestall inadvertent, “stealth” catering to special interests out of ignorance created by
one-sided information gathering.
Once again, the problems detailed above resemble quite closely the problems
identified in the direct expenditure and tax expenditure (and cost benefit analysis) budgets.
What we learned from those contexts should be carried over to this one: we should not let
yearning for what we cannot have stand in the way of reaching for the best of what is
available. When deciding whether information should be provided to the public, the ultimate
question is whether the information would, on balance, improve governmental (and voter)
decisionmaking. And we should apply the same standards to all the various information
sources.

107

See Elizabeth Garrett, Interest Groups and Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
137, 139 (2000) (“Lawmakers and other political players....can seek to manipulate rules and procedures so that
they do not operate as roadblocks.”).
108
See id. at 140 (“Ironically, maximizing opportunities for participation has also maximized the
opportunity for strategic behavior.”).
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Both baseline and measurement problems are ubiquitous. We long ago decided that
they should not stand in the way of publishing the zero-expenditure baseline budget. A
similar decision was made with respect to the tax expenditure budget almost thirty years ago,
and should be reaffirmed. It is time to do the same for both a unified cost-benefit schedule
and a contact audit. Pairing the two will give readers an idea both of major agency actions
and decisions not to act, just as we currently provide information about spending that takes
place directly and indirectly, by forgoing tax collections. Although providing such schedules
in the federal budget document will not guarantee that all legislators, let alone all voters,
internalize and fully digest the limited implications of this material, it will make
governmental decisions somewhat more transparent. It would be a step in the right direction.
Conclusion
Monitoring requires information about the subject being monitored. And no one
would dispute that using perfect information—perfectly accurate, perfectly complete—in the
monitoring process is the ideal. But like all ideals, this one is often impossible to attain. To
avoid paralysis, people are forced to rely on incomplete information. This does not mean that
they should treat the information they receive as perfect. Indeed, knowledge of the
shortcomings of one’s information stream can be a critical factor in decision making. It
justifies leaving open the possibility of altering behavior as additional information becomes
available, or compensating for systemic skews in the information stream. This is as true in
the budget context as in any other. None of the current sources of information is perfect. But
the response should not be to ignore the information that is available. It defies belief that
politicians would be better behaved (i.e. engage in less rent-seeking behavior) if the budget
or the tax expenditure budget were kept secret, or made available to the public in a less
digestible form. The solution is to try to make those sources of information better, either by
changing them or by supplementing them with other sources of information. This article
suggests two candidates for such supplementation, both aimed at an obvious substitute for
behavior which the publication of the current budget and tax expenditure budget is aimed at
exposing to public view. Like the budgets that preceded it, the cost-benefit schedule and
contact audits will not provide perfect information. But by improving transparency, they
should provide voters with better information than they now have. It is perhaps more
academic and much cleaner to criticize all devices that build on artificially constructed
baselines, but it is more useful to think of ways in which we can improve real
decisionmaking and monitoring processes.
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University of Chicago Law School
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